Win or Lose, tt’s the policy we choose: Comparative economic performance of the inflation targeters by Beja, Edsel Jr.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Win or Lose, tt’s the policy we choose:
Comparative economic performance of
the inflation targeters
Edsel Jr. Beja
Ateneo de Manila University
25. April 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12784/
MPRA Paper No. 12784, posted 16. January 2009 06:52 UTC
Win or Lose, it’s the PoLicy 
We choose: comParative 
economic Performance of 
the infLation targeters
edsel L. Beja, Jr.
Abstract
The inflation-growth relationship for the inflation targeters 
is estimated for the period 2001-2006. The results show that 
inflation is negatively correlated with economic growth, while 
the indicators for aggregate demand and supply are positively 
correlated with economic growth. These findings suggest that 
rather than a singular focus on inflation targeting—especially 
aiming at too low rates of inflation—a positive combination of 
economic policies can be the more productive direction to pursue 
to achieve broad-based economic performance. Such a direction 
is possible when the authorities acknowledge the compatibility of 
orthodox targets (e.g., price stability) with unorthodox strategies 
(e.g., counter-cyclical and compensating actions) in economic 
management. It is also argued that this view applies to the case 
of the Philippines, where an upsurge in inflation is typically 
driven by external rather than domestic factors and achieving 
robust economic growth is very important. 
_____
INTRODUCTION
An interesting aspect to the current orthodoxy in mainstream economics 
is its partiality to assign specific form to a function, thus overlooking the 
large amount of empirical research and historical experience which reveal 
that successful economic management requires the adoption of multiple 
strategies, the encouragement of creativity and innovation, as well as 
serious institution-building (e.g., Chang, 2007; Rodrik, 2007). In central 
banking, for instance, this orthodoxy has defined the function of ensuring 
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price stability to mean focusing on inflation targeting, and articulated as 
the mandate of central banks. Accordingly, the central bank embarks to 
achieve that announced desirable rate of inflation using monetary tools. 
Announcing a desired rate of inflation is very important in the 
orthodox view because it pacifies private business concerns such as the 
realization and control of profits, the protection of wealth and private 
property, etc. It also enhances the credibility of the central bank in the 
execution of monetary policy, at least in the view of private business and 
international finance. Likewise, there is increased confidence that the 
public sector will not be profligate in its spending. The central bank in 
the end is only able to steer the economy within the inflation target, while 
the government is limited in its delivery of public goods and services. 
Put another way, through the espousal of the orthodoxy—like inflation 
targeting—government withdrawal from pursuing its developmental role 
is facilitated, if not encouraged. 
In inflation targeting, the target has to be sufficiently low—usually 
aiming at a rate of inflation from 1 to 3 percent—so that private business 
and finance need not have to worry about it when making everyday 
decisions. As suggested earlier, aiming at a very low rate of inflation and 
being able to show success in meeting a target bestow on the central bank 
credibility and transparency, suggesting “effective” and “sound” central 
banking. In a way, it becomes accountable (only) to private business and 
finance rather than to the public. In this way, inflation targeting, argues 
the orthodoxy, leads to increased economic stability and facilitates robust 
economic growth.1 Accordingly, developments that jeopardize the inflation 
target necessitate serious actions such as contractionary interest rates, 
reduced money supply and credit, and the like, in order to ensure that the 
monetary aggregates are realigned to bring inflation within target.2 
1 The rise of neoliberal economics has meant the defense of finance capital to ensure 
its complete control and disposition of wealth and power at the expense of public welfare. 
In similar manner, inflation targeting is underpinned by a fear (by private interests) that 
inflation undermines wealth and power. Governments that manage the economy against 
adverse cycles, discipline speculative activities that undercut economic stability, employment 
generation, or other related interventions, are seen as unfriendly to market operations and 
anathema to finance. The private interest thus puts an aggressive opposition employing the 
threat of capital strike (i.e., flow stoppage or withdrawal). As such, economic management 
must be done in a way that is agreeable to finance. It is in this context and in other areas 
of the economy that inflation targeting is being pushed by neoliberal economics, in effect 
pushing central banks to move away from their traditional developmental role (e.g., Epstein, 
2007). See also Harvey (2005) for a concise history of neoliberalism. 
2 It needs to be pointed out that some central banks have adopted escape clauses in 
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Whether or not inflation targeting promotes economic growth remains 
controversial. This debate has produced a rather large body of literature. 
Bruno & Easterly (1998), Pollin & Zhu (2005), and Epstein & Yeldan 
(2007), for example, find that economic growth remains possible even 
though the inflation rate is in the range of 15-20 percent. They argue that 
it is the manner in which inflation targeting is pursued by the central bank 
that really matters. What brings about low economic growth and weak 
jobs generation is the deflationary stance that authorities take up when 
adopting inflation targeting. In turn, targeting brings about costs that 
exceed the purported benefits. The conclusion that one can make from 
these studies is that it is the obsession to achieve a very low rate of inflation 
that causes problems, the result of a policy that discourages broad-based 
economic performance, which means stable and robust economic growth 
that leads to the creation of jobs, increases in average incomes, and equitable 
distribution of benefits and opportunities.3
There are studies that find a negative correlation between inflation 
and economic growth, such as Grier & Tullock (1989), Barro (1996), 
and Ghosh & Phillips (1998). Some even point out that there can be 
a nonlinear relationship between inflation and economic growth. Of 
course, the experiences of many countries indicate that in addition to 
curtailing economic growth, high levels of inflation bring about other 
adverse consequences on the economy. For example, the instabilities 
that emerge with the reduction in economic growth can lead to the 
suppression of incomes, jobs, investments, and so on, in turn further 
curtailing growth thereby producing a vicious cycle of stagflation. In the 
end, underdevelopment is produced. The high levels of inflation necessitate 
significant economic adjustments that not only derail economic growth but 
also push the economy to lower growth trajectories. These are ultimately 
costly to societies, and often, the poor suffer from such unfavorable 
developments. It is therefore very important that the authorities ensure 
price stability. Thus Feldstein (1997), Corbo et al., (2001), and Miskin & 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), among others, stress that on balance the benefits 
their inflation targeting policies like Czech Republic, New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, South Africa, and Sweden (e.g., Roger & Stone, 2005; Tuladhar, 2005; 
Heenan et al., 2006). See the discussion for the case of the Philippines below.
3 If broad-based economic performance is expanded to mean standard of living (i.e., 
human development), then other dimensions have to be added like universal health 
care, quality education at all levels, social security, infrastructure development, clean 
environment, waste management, etc.
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of inflation targeting exceed the costs. They further indicate that when 
inflation targeting is applied well the economic performance is going to be 
stabilized, in turn facilitating a virtuous cycle of robust economic growth, 
jobs generation, greater investments, and so on, which ultimately means 
the realization of broad-based economic performance.
Interestingly, though, there are proponents of inflation targeting 
such as Blinder (1998), Bernanke et al., (1999), Dueker & Fisher (2006) 
who point out that inflation targeting is not necessarily superior to other 
stabilization policies. In fact, they contend that the purported benefits of 
low levels of inflation can be achieved using some alternative economic 
strategies. The idea is that if the authorities have more policy instruments 
in their control, they have alternatives on how best to achieve stabilization 
and expansion that takes into consideration the local circumstances. Such a 
situation is going to be more favorable for realizing broad-based economic 
performance, even with inflation targeting. 
Meanwhile, Arestis & Sawyer (2005), Ball & Sheridan (2005), and 
Roger & Stone (2005), among others, point out that the success of inflation 
targeting can be due to other factors, but not inflation targeting itself. 
Global economic slowdown induces a deflationary environment. Favorable 
global supply factors relieve pressures on prices. Such conditions translate 
as reductions in domestic inflation and thus contribute to successful 
inflation targeting. The reverse situation induces inflationary pressures and 
thus makes inflation targeting more challenging. In the same fashion, the 
perceived success of inflation targeting in the Philippines can be argued 
as not solely due to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas inflation targeting 
policy because external factors like lower inflation in the Asian region 
and depressed external demand, especially from two of its biggest trade 
partners—Japan continuing on a decade-long economic stagnation and the 
United States going into an economic recession in 2001 and continuing 
to be relatively weak—contributed to successful targeting. On the other 
hand, the rise in oil prices contributed to inflationary pressures, thus 
undermining the inflation targets.
This debate—whether or not inflation targeting is a good policy to 
pursue, whether it is a strategy that brings more benefits than costs—
continues. The same can be said about the debate on the tradeoff between 
inflation and economic growth. This paper specifically addresses the latter 
issue: it examines the relationship between inflation and economic growth 
among the inflation targeters.4 Obviously, the adjustments in the conduct 
4 There is no attempt to compare the economic performance of inflation and non-
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of monetary policy would have started in the run up to the adoption of 
inflation targeting, but the sample of countries is further narrowed down 
to comprise only those that have pursued inflation targeting for at least 
five years. 
The proposition tested in this paper is that inflation targeting is a 
desirable policy because it contributes to the realization of robust economic 
growth. And because inflation targeting has increasingly been included in 
stabilization and liberalization programs, the results have important policy 
implications beyond targeting itself. If the results suggest that inflation 
targeting contributes to the realization of robust economic growth, those 
that have not adopted inflation targeting may have to recognize the 
usefulness of inflation targeting and take steps to adopt it. On the other 
hand, if the results do not support the purported relationship, those who 
are pursuing inflation targeting may have to reconsider their policy and by 
extension consider alternative strategies that can lead to robust economic 
growth. 
The next section describes the methodology followed by a discussion 
of the cross-country results. Philippine inflation targeting is presented in 
the fourth section as a case study in order to juxtapose the cross-country 
empirics with in-country experience, thereby contextualizing the general 
debate in the local circumstances. 
METHODOLOGY
This paper empirically verifies the correlation between inflation and 
economic growth among the inflation targeters using the model: Y = α + 
Xβ + ε, where Y is gross domestic product growth rate and X is a vector of 
control variables, including inflation, aggregate demand-linked indicators 
(e.g., government expenditures, and current account deficits), and aggregate 
supply-linked indicators (e.g., gross fixed capital formation, education 
expenditure per student, and labor force). To account for other factors, 
a region dummy is included in the regression to capture differences in 
economic performance between emerging and industrialized economies, 
taking a value of one for the former and zero otherwise. Period dummies 
are also included to capture the overall trend in global economic growth. 
inflation targeters for the simple reason that the policy options available to both groups 
may not be the same, thus inferring that the latter performs better because of the absence 
of inflation targeting itself is tricky. Studies such as Dueker & Fisher (2006) and Mishkin 
& Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) compare both groups but have different conclusions. 
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There are also interaction terms to capture other possible relationships that 
can explain economic growth, albeit in a rudimentary manner. Except for 
the dummy variables, the rest of the variables in the model are expressed 
in growth forms in 2000 constant prices. Once again, inflation targeters 
refer to the countries that have employed inflation targeting in the period 
2001-2006 (see the list of countries at the end of the paper). The raw data 
are taken from the World Development Indicators 2007. The regression was 
done using EViews.
WIN OR LOSE: EMPIRICS ON INFLATION TARGETERS
Table 1 summarizes the various regression runs. Column 1 is the basic 
result, where economic growth is regressed on inflation together with 
region and period dummies. Inflation is found to be strongly negatively 
correlated with economic growth, with an estimated impact of 15 basis 
points. That is to say, a unit increase in inflation can result in 15 basis 
points reduction in economic growth. 
The results for the various specifications in Table 1 show that inflation 
and economic growth are indeed negatively correlated to each other. 
Economic growth is therefore sensitive to inflation, at least for the inflation 
targeters. This finding is consistent with the general view that inflation has 
adverse effects on the economy and so merits policy attention. At least for 
the inflation targeters, the results in Table 1 suggest that the real economy 
is not totally independent of inflation. 
Columns 2 and 3 show that including the quadratic and lagged 
specifications of inflation do not give statistically significant results, even if 
the expected signs are still obtained. Because the results are not statistically 
different from zero, such specifications are not pursued further. These 
results basically suggest that inflation does not have a nonlinear relationship 
with economic growth, at least for the inflation targeters. The absence of 
such a relationship is perhaps due to the fact that the impact of inflation 
on economic growth is more in the immediate period. 
Columns 4 to 8 present the results when aggregate demand-linked 
indicators are included in the regressions, which show that indicators 
for government and current account expenditures are strongly positively 
correlated with economic growth. The size of the individual coefficient 
is rather small; however, their aggregate impact is comparable to that of 
inflation. Altogether, columns 4 to 8 suggest that aggregate demand-
linked indicators can explain an average of 11 basis points of economic 
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Table 1. Regression Results on Inflation-Growth TradeoffTable 1. Regression Results on Inflation-Growth Tradeoff
Dependent Variable:  Growth 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Constant   4.34hs  4.27hs  4.47hs  4.44hs  4.31hs  3.98hs
Inflation -0.15hs -0.11 -0.15vs -0.21hs -0.19hs -0.18hs
Inflation-Square  -0.00     
Inflation-Lagged   -0.00    
Government Expenditure     0.09s  0.09s  0.23ws
Current Account Balance    -0.04vs -0.04vs -0.07hs
Current Account-Lagged    -0.02   
Fixed Capital Formation       
Education Expenditure       
Labor Force       
Emerging Economy  1.38hs  1.38hs  1.33hs  1.49hs  1.39hs  1.86hs
Government Expenditure in 
Emerging Economy      -0.15 
Current Account in
Emerging Economy       0.14hs
Fixed Capital Formation in 
 Emerging Economy       
Education Expenditure in 
Emerging Economy       
Labor Force in 
           Emerging Economy       
Dummy 2001 -2.18hs -2.19hs -2.28hs -2.26hs -2.16hs -2.21hs
Dummy 2002 -1.78hs -1.78hs -1.88hs -1.94hs -1.83hs -1.89hs
Dummy 2003 -1.53hs -1.51hs -1.62hs -1.82hs -1.69hs -1.69hs
Dummy 2004 -0.21 -0.21 -0.31 -0.43 -0.30 -0.38 
Dummy 2005 -0.68ws -0.68ws -0.78ws -1.09vs -0.93vs -0.94s
Adjusted R-Square  0.31  0.31  0.31  0.35  0.34  0.39 
F-Statistics  8.05  6.98  7.02  6.84  7.36  7.38 
Note: hs = 1 percent significance; vs = 5 percent significance; s = 10 percent significance; and 
          w = 15 percent significance. 
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Table 1. Continued…le 1 Continued…
Dependent Variable: Growth 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 Constant   3.92hs  4.26hs  3.61hs  3.45hs   3.51hs   3.24hs
Inflation -0.20hs -0.18hs -0.12hs -0.13hs  -0.13hs  -0.13hs
Inflation-Square       
Inflation-Lagged       
Government Expenditure  0.28vs  0.09s     
Current Account Balance -0.03s -0.08hs     
Current Account-Lagged       
Fixed Capital Formation    0.11hs  0.14hs   0.11hs   0.13hs
Education Expenditure    0.02  0.08vs   
Labor Force        0.10ws   0.24ws
Emerging Economy  1.98hs  1.44hs  1.18hs  1.61hs   1.17hs   1.63hs
Government Expenditure in 
Emerging Economy -0.21s      
Current Account in 
      Emerging Economy  0.15hs     
Fixed Capital Formation in 
    Emerging Economy    -0.05ws   -0.03 
Education Expenditure in 
 Emerging Economy    -0.06s   
Labor Force in 
            Emerging Economy       -0.21 
Dummy 2001 -2.34hs -2.08hs -1.61hs -1.78hs  -1.59hs  -1.60hs
Dummy 2002 -1.99hs -1.77hs -1.26hs -1.42hs  -1.24hs  -1.23hs
Dummy 2003 -1.78hs -1.63hs -1.44hs -1.54hs  -1.35hs  -1.36hs
Dummy 2004 -0.43 -0.29 -0.44 -0.58s  -0.45  -0.47 
Dummy 2005 -1.01vs -0.88vs -1.00vs -1.08hs  -0.89vs  -0.89vs
Adjusted R-Square  0.35  0.39  0.53  0.54   0.53   0.53 
F-Statistics  6.87  8.01 14.50 12.61 14.48 12.07 
Note: hs = 1 percent significance; vs = 5 percent significance; s = 10 percent significance; and 
          w = 15 percent significance. 
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growth, while inflation can explain an average of 19 basis points.5 These 
findings are not surprising because inflation targeters typically carry 
out restrictive expenditure policies that limit the role of demand-linked 
indicators in inducing economic growth. That is to say, government 
spending tends to be restrictive because of fear that it induces a surge in 
inflation. Similarly, there can be a surplus in the current account as one 
consequence of a contractionary expenditure position rather than export 
competitiveness. How much of economic growth can be explained by 
aggregate demand-linked indicators under an inflation targeting regime 
is limited as a result. 
The results suggest that aggregate demand-linked indicators can 
actually be important drivers of economic growth if they are allowed to do 
so. The more important point is that such findings support the contention 
that Keynesian policies remain useful in engendering economic growth. If 
aggregate demand-linked indicators are enhanced with appropriate policies 
that allow for greater public sector involvement, sensible spending, and 
so on, they can have a much stronger contribution to economic growth, 
in turn contributing to enabling a cumulative process and thus realizing 
long-term economic expansions.6
The next results are for the aggregate supply-linked indicators. 
Columns 9 to 12 suggest that on average the coefficients explain about 
12 basis points of economic growth and, once again, these figures are 
comparable to inflation’s, which is about 13 basis points.7 Again, the 
results for the supply-linked indicators are to be expected in light of what 
standard growth theory contends: capital and labor and human capital 
5 These figures are simple averages of the regression results shown in Columns 4 to 8               
(Table 1). As for the aggregate demand-linked indicators, absolute values of the coefficients 
of the current account balance are used since “deficit” spending is preferred to induce 
economic growth. It also needs to be pointed out that alternative measures for demand-
linked indicators may produce stronger impacts on economic growth.
6 There is of course no guarantee that the benefits of economic growth are distributed 
evenly across society. Stimulating economic growth is a necessary first step to stimulate the 
creation of an environment that sustains growth and also creates conditions that facilitate 
poverty reduction and income distribution. Higher incomes provide a direct route to 
increase human capabilities and realize development. Where economic growth has not 
taken place or limited, poverty has persisted if not worsened. In those situations, the poor 
often carry the disproportionate burden of the economic contraction and maladjustments. 
Needless to say, policies that stimulate economic growth are different from those for 
economic development, the latter requiring efforts toward institutional building and 
deepening of reforms.
7 As in footnote 3, these figures are simple averages of the regression results shown in 
Columns 9 to 12 (Table 1).
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together with technology are key inputs to economic growth. Thus the 
combination of capital formation with a well-educated labor force—by 
extension, labor that can productively utilize technology to generate more 
output—can engender robust economic growth. Thus such findings 
support the proposition that supply-side policies continue to be useful 
in engendering economic growth. It is for this reason that governments 
need policies that not only attract capital that bring in additional resources 
and technology to enhance domestic productivity growth and set off 
industrialization, but at the same time introduce policies that ensure 
human capital formation to enable it to fully exploit capital and technology, 
thereby relieving some of the constraints to economic growth and widening 
economic opportunities for all. The enhancement of the supply-side factors 
to support economic growth in turn sustains production in a cumulative 
process that leads not only to robust economic growth but also to real 
structural transformations.
Finally, the lower half of Table 1 presents the results for other dummy 
indicators and the interaction terms. As expected, the emerging economies 
have higher average economic growth than the industrialized economies. 
This simply suggests that the former are on the steeper segments of the 
growth trajectories, while the latter are on the flatter segments. The 
coefficients on the interaction terms such as capital formation in the 
emerging economies indicate that capital in these economies make 
relatively smaller contribution to economic growth than in industrialized 
economies. This finding is also to be expected given that the productivity 
of capital is relatively higher in the latter than in the former. Lastly, the 
period dummies confirm the contention that the global trends in economic 
growth have been increasing since 2001, as shown by the progressively 
decreasing magnitudes of the coefficients. Indeed, since the Asian financial 
crisis of the late 1990s and the United States recession in 2001, global 
economic performance has been on the uptrend, although this view needs 
to be qualified for the period 2007 onwards.
These results in Table 1 basically confirm the negative correlation 
between inflation and economic growth, as argued by Grier & Tullock 
(1989), Barro (1996), and Ghosh & Phillips (1998). But potential impact 
of inflation targeting on economic growth is not as big as argued by the 
proponents of inflation targeting. While aiming for a lower rate of inflation 
at, say, 1 percent can increase potential economic growth to 5.7 percent 
from 5.5 percent among emerging economies and 4.3 percent from 4.1 
for the industrialized economies (Column 1), note that the reduction of 
inflation brings about negligible positive results to economic growth while 
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it can lead to greater adverse effects on the economy like reduced public 
expenditures on infrastructure and services, human capital formation, 
capital accumulation, and so on, which in the long-run undermine 
economic growth. In short, the adverse impacts from aggregate demand 
and supply contractions can outweigh the economic benefits of inflation 
targeting. 
One reason for such limited outcome is that inflation targeters 
already have low levels of inflation, estimated at about 2.8 percent among 
emerging economies and about 1 percent among industrialized economies. 
That is to say, further gains in terms of economic growth cannot be had 
through inflation targeting alone. There is thus little space for considering 
policies that enhance the economic growth from price stabilization alone. 
Moreover, pushing policies to realize too low inflation risks the generation 
of a deflationary environment. 
Following earlier studies, the threshold at which inflation stops 
economic growth among the inflation targeters is estimated at about 24.4 
percent, a figure comparable to those presented in, for example, Bruno & 
Easterly (1998) and Pollin & Zhu (2005).8 However, the contention that a 
high level of inflation has to be tolerated since anyway the threshold is 24.4 
percent must be avoided. Of course, inflation is going to be harmful when 
it undermines the purchasing power and standards of living. Yet the claim 
to moderate the responsibility to stabilize prices does not mean allowing 
inflation to go wayward because, obviously, that will produce economic 
problems. The contention is that with already low levels of inflations, it 
is possible to increase economic growth if authorities recognize that some 
room is possible to relax inflation targets a bit. Taking up the empirical 
results that reveal aggregate demand- and supply-linked indicators can 
contribute to raising economic growth by comparable amounts to what 
inflation targeting promises, it can therefore be argued that pursuing a 
positive combination of policies is a much better strategy for achieving 
broad-based economic performance. As long as the increases in prices with 
an upsurge in economic growth is outpaced by expansions in productivity, 
greater jobs creation, expenditures on capacity building, and the like, that 
enhance the public welfare, there need not be unnecessary inflationary 
pressures. This point is important because the mainstream approach 
8 First, the aggregate demand and supply-linked indicators, the dummy variables, 
and interaction terms are all assumed zero, thus growth = ĉ + â inflation, where ĉ and â 
are the estimated values. To get the threshold, set growth to zero. The simple average for 
Columns 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 12 (Table 1) is reported. These six columns have the best 
regression results.
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generates fear of inflation, which can turn out to be a not healthy position 
for the inflation targeters in the long-run. Such a stance is especially 
problematic when there are unutilized domestic capacities and there are 
possibilities to create new capacities, increase investments and enhance 
profitability. Overcoming the economic and political obstacles to pursue 
sound policies is key to succeed in introducing a positive combination 
of policies.
Incidentally, the verified negative correlation between inflation and 
economic growth can be the result of the fact that the inflation targeters 
have stabilized their inflations. Recent global trends in inflation can be 
additional support to the positive performance of the inflation targeters. 
Additionally, this verified negative correlation can exist because inflation 
targeters have taken up financial liberalization that has pushed governments 
to take up conservative fiscal and monetary policies, which has contributed 
to compromise productivity, incomes and social objectives, etc. that weaken 
economic performance. Of course, the proponents of inflation targeting 
stress that a financially liberalized economy is desirable in itself because 
where capital is highly regulated, inflation targeting cannot function well. 
They also point out that the non-financially liberalized economies mean 
that governments have too much space to respond to domestic demands 
at the expense of external considerations, particularly that of international 
capital. Nonetheless, it needs to be noted that where the external sector and 
private business and finance can impose on domestic policies, aggregate 
demand- and supply-enhancement policies are also difficult to pursue 
because capital can go on a strike against expansionary policies with the fear 
of inflation. Jobs targeting and industrial policy, for example, are frowned 
upon because they are seen as inflation-creating. In the end, inflation 
targeters can be pulled into a deflationary phase in which economic growth 
cannot be allowed to accelerate. Needless to say, high rates of inflation are 
harmful, but too low inflations are equally harmful as well.
Inflation targeting by itself explains little of broad-based economic 
performance. From a policy point of view, a positive combination of 
policies is a better strategy for carrying out various objectives: monetary, 
fiscal, exchange rate, productivity, incomes and social policies. This latter 
approach is to be preferred where there are excess capacities manifested by, 
for example, large unemployment and idle resources. Such a combination 
of policies is more constructive, progressive and brings about more desirable 
outcomes. Pursuing a broader mix of policies can be Pareto improving in 
the long-term. Accordingly, the present configuration of inflation targeting 
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needs to be modified to make it compatible with broad-based economic 
performance. If inflation targeting is to be pursued, aggregate demand- 
and supply-linked policies need to be introduced as well to minimize—if 
not avoid—adverse effects on the real economy. 
The key point is that the gains to inflation targeting can be enlarged 
with demand- and supply-linked policies to support and enhance economic 
growth. This direction is possible if the authorities acknowledge the 
compatibility of various policy objectives like combining orthodox policies 
(i.e., inflation targeting) with unorthodox policies (i.e., countercyclical 
and compensating measures) to stimulate and sustain economic growth. 
At the same time, the effectiveness of a positive combination of policies 
is contingent on acknowledging that socio-economic and political 
characteristics differ from place to place and cannot be made a priori.9
There is one more item before proceeding to discuss Philippine 
inflation targeting. About 30 to 50 percent of economic growth is explained 
by the indicators used in the regressions (Table 1), so the model can have 
higher explanatory power if additional indicators are included. Feder 
(1983), Esfahani (1991) and Wacziarg (2001), for example, suggest that 
international trade is one important factor that can enhance economic 
growth. The impact of trade can be transmitted via its effect on productivity 
and other spillovers effects. Beck et al. (2000) and Bekaert et al. (2001), 
for example, suggest a similar effect for international finance, with better 
technology, for example, brought in through foreign direct investments 
and competition. 
Most studies stress the supply-side factors to economic growth, while 
an alternative approach that stress the demand-side dimension to economic 
growth can also be adopted, specifically those by Kaldor (1967), Thirlwall 
(1979), and Thirlwall & Hussain (1982). At this point, however, data 
constraint does not allow us to estimate such extensions in the model 
(Table 1) that incorporates cumulative causation of variables. For now, it 
is enough to argue that there are good reasons to expand the analysis to 
include other determinants of economic growth, particularly to capture 
the potential positive effects of sound execution of international trade and 
finance that can lead to a cumulative process of economic growth that can 
exceed the benefits of inflation targeting.10 
9 By extension, there is room available to policy makers to introduce adaptation, 
innovation and experimentation in the design of policies to promote economic growth. 
10 This dimension in the determinants of economic growth is the subject of another 
paper. 
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WIN OR LOSE: PHILIPPINE INFLATION TARGETING
Inflation targeting was adopted in the Philippines in the beginning of 
2002, but its genesis can be traced two years earlier.11 Inflation targeting is 
seen as a welcome development in view of the previous policy of the Bangko 
Sentral ng Pilipinas (henceforth, Bangko Sentral) that focused on monetary 
targeting. The experience with the policy was not at all positive because it 
supported deflationary periods especially during crises as in the early 1980s 
and 1990s. In turn, it contributed to worsening the economic problems, 
that led to much greater economic contractions than expected.
One interesting feature of Philippine inflation targeting is that it allows 
some degree of policy flexibility.12 First, inflation targeting in the country 
includes an escape clause that releases the Bangko Sentral from sticking 
to its target when there are extenuating circumstances that make targeting 
detrimental to economic growth. This innovation acknowledges the 
problems that the country encounters: disruptions in domestic production 
(especially agriculture), natural disasters and tragedies that disturb 
production, shocks in international supplies (especially oil and other 
inputs) that upset domestic markets, and the like. These circumstances 
induce an inflationary push that monetary policy can not directly deal with. 
Policy changes like new taxes or adjustments like large devaluations have 
historically been inflationary, and like the supply-side shocks, they make 
monetary policy less effective. The escape clause thus gives the Bangko 
Sentral latitude to assess the situation in order to determine if an adjustment 
in monetary policy is necessary to bring economic growth within inflation 
targets. In effect, the Bangko Sentral says that it defends price stability 
only during “normal” economic conditions, but confers the responsibility 
of stabilization to other agencies during “abnormal” conditions. However, 
this direction leaves the economy much more vulnerable because under 
“abnormal” conditions, Philippine fiscal policy cannot or does not provide 
the needed counter-cyclical stimulus for the economy.
Another feature of Philippine inflation targeting is the core and 
11 Lim (2006) presents a comprehensive analysis of Philippine inflation targeting and 
alternative policies for broad-based economic performance. Dumlao (2004, 2005) and 
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (2005) are earlier debates published in this journal. 
12 Canada, Czech Republic, New Zealand, and South Africa have included escape 
clauses in the design of inflation targeting. Note that the use of headline and core inflation 
in inflation targeting is not common among inflation targeters. Economies that employ 
core inflation are South Korea, Norway, and Thailand.
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headline inflation setup.13 In the former, the factors that are directly 
connected to the extenuating circumstances as covered by the escape clause 
described above are excluded in the measure of inflation. The latter is the 
standard measure of inflation. This dual setup permits the Bangko Sentral 
flexibility to maintain monetary policy as long as the core inflation remains 
within target. In so doing, it has adopted an approach that is similar to 
that of the United States Federal Reserve System, which considers the 
robustness of the economy as the primary consideration when adjusting 
monetary policy. In effect, the Bangko Sentral allows itself discretionary 
policy actions. Incidentally, the Bangko Sentral yields some of its autonomy 
to the United States Federal Reserve System. 
Inflation targeting in the Philippines as such has largely been 
accommodating, playing the supporting role to economic performance. 
The irony of the situation is that precisely because of the factors that are 
beyond the control of the Bangko Sentral the impact of inflation targeting 
has been on balance benign on the economy. In other words, monetary 
policy can be described to have been a passive-supporter to economic 
performance rather than an active-instigator, albeit the Bangko Sentral 
is bounded by the Bangko Sentral Act of 1993 that mandates it to focus 
on price stability. 
After the adoption of inflation targeting in 2002, the Bangko Sentral 
has invoked the escape clause several times.14 Because of the extenuating 
circumstances, the Bangko Sentral has opted not to adjust monetary 
policy, except in 2005 when it raised interest rates perhaps to ward off 
speculation as the Philippines went into a fiscal bind and also partly because 
core inflation exceeded the target. In 2002 and 2003, inflation was 3 and 
3.5 percent, respectively, below the target of 4.5 to 5.5 percent because 
of falling food prices (as agricultural production recovered in 2003) and 
subdued demand with a decline in global economic growth in 2001 (as the 
United States and European economies experienced economic slowdowns 
and Japan remained stagnant). An extended dry spell in 2001 induced 
inflationary pressures, but it was moderated with excess capacities as the 
economy was still picking up from the Asian financial crisis, while global 
oil prices were falling for the most part in this period. Meantime, the 
13 The Primer on Inflation Targeting by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas is downloadable 
from http://www. bsp.gov.ph/downloads/Publications/FAQs/targeting.pdf
14 The Open Letters of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to the 
President of the Republic of the Philippines are downloadable from http://www.bsp.gov.
ph/monetary/open.asp and Quarterly Reports on Inflation from http://www.bsp.gov.
ph/publications/regular_inflation.asp
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Bangko Sentral set inflation targets at 4.5 to 5.5 percent because of the 
perceived higher risks of an economic slowdown in the following year and 
oil prices increasing following the United States-Iraq War. 
Inflation in 2004 rose to 6 percent, higher than the target of 4 to 5 
percent. The higher prices were induced by factors related to food and 
energy products, including record-breaking global oil prices that led to 
increases in domestic transportation and utilities costs. These increases 
in costs actually continued into 2005. Moreover, higher prices of meat 
products occurred because of higher external demand due to the avian flu 
scare in Asia that was met with some diversion of domestic supplies to the 
external markets. Weather-related disturbances like a series of typhoons in 
2004 and the extended dry season in the first half of 2005 aggravated the 
situation. Inflation in the end was pushed outside the targets. Meanwhile, 
as the global economy continued its expansion and production capacities 
were being used up, demand for global oil and other inputs continued 
to rise. Prices increased which translated into higher domestic costs of 
production, transportation, and utilities, inducing some adjustments in 
domestic wages. It needs to be noted that within Asia, the continued robust 
economic growth of China has made it a key importer of global oil and 
production inputs and contributor to an inflationary environment. As for 
the Philippines, the convergence of various factors consequently meant 
that inflation reached 7.6 percent, exceeding the 5 to 6 percent target. In 
fact, the recovery of agriculture production and easing of oil prices late in 
2005 were not enough to mitigate inflation in that year.
Inflation continued to increase early in 2006, in part the result of 
the introduction of the expanded value added tax (raising the previous 
value added tax from 10 to 12 percent) in 2005. Fortunately, the increase 
in inflation was largely a one-shot rise in prices and its impact dissipated 
starting in 2006. The recovery of agriculture production and the steady 
strengthening of the peso in 2006 contributed to ease the pressure on 
inflation. The latter mitigated the impact of high global oil prices. When 
oil prices eased up in the latter part of 2006 and as robust economic 
expansion continued, inflation was stabilized at 6.2 percent though still 
higher than the target of 4 to 5 percent for the year.
Inflation in mid-year of 2007 remained within the target of 4 to 5 
percent despite once again an extended dry season plus the heavy spending 
during the national elections. Fortunately, strong economic growth in the 
first half of 2006 did not result in increases in prices. The peso continued 
to gain strength, while cost of inputs and global oil prices have temporarily 
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stopped increasing, albeit they are already at historically high levels. These 
developments sustained the downtrend in inflation in the early part of the 
year, dropping to an average of 2.7 percent. If the global demand remains 
steady, even with the housing sector crisis in the United States, inflation 
target for 2007 can still be met. If ever, an economic adjustment in the 
United States is going to occur in 2008. If so and if Japan remains unable 
to resolve its economic doldrums, it is possible to see another global 
deflation like that from 2001 to 2003 in 2008. A strong peso and robust 
economic growth in the second half of the year have helped mitigate 
inflationary pressures despite strong domestic consumption fueling growth. 
Nonetheless, inflation has edged up to 3.2 percent by end of 2007. In 
any case, the Bangko Sentral meets its inflation target not because it is 
successful in targeting but because it passively did so.
Strong from the Outside but Still Soft Inside
Historically, the Philippines tended to have higher and variable 
inflations principally due to supply shocks that translate into higher 
domestic prices. Additionally, swings in the exchange rate are linked to 
troubles in the external sector such as balance of payments problems that 
are connected to sudden and massive flows of finance or excessive current 
account deficits with imports often larger relative to export earnings, which 
in turn contribute to shortages in foreign exchange, then weakening the 
peso and increasing the cost of imports. Imported inflation thus feeds into 
the overall level of prices. With the subsequent economic adjustment, the 
resulting inflationary pressure is intensified.
There are also real sector shocks in the Philippines. Volatile food 
prices result from low agricultural productivity that recurring adverse 
weather conditions aggravate. The former is partly the consequence of 
limited agricultural support infrastructure. A related problem is the limited 
road and transportation network in the countryside for a cost-effective 
distribution of agricultural products to various parts of the country. 
Meanwhile, the existing roads, bridges and ports need to be improved 
in order to enhance access to markets and capacity. Because of all this, 
agricultural prices are misaligned. All these changes require comprehensive 
actions to raise agriculture productivity to address a key supply-side 
pressure on inflation. 
Moreover, industries that provide key production inputs and services 
like transportation and utilities are characterized by origopolistic structures, 
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which have important implications to prices. In this situation, the price 
mark up that sellers put on their goods contributes to an inflationary spiral, 
especially when such actions are done to preempt oligopolistic pricing.
Another important source of inflation is persistent large fiscal deficits, 
which in the past was financed through excessive money growth. This 
problem is less of an issue today because the Bangko Sentral can pursue 
monetary policy without undue pressures from the fiscal sector. Still, the 
fiscal position in the country has not been encouraging to support a much 
needed expansion in public infrastructure and social services. In fact, the 
government has been moving away from its role as facilitator of domestic 
investments as it progressively reduces public investments.  
With the Philippines constrained from spending on crucial public 
infrastructure and social services and creating an environment that 
facilitates capital accumulation and capacity expansion (despite relatively 
good economic performance in recent years), there is even less groundwork 
to provide conditions for long-term economic growth. Indeed, while 
domestic conditions have been quite favorable for stimulating robust 
economic growth in the short-term, the institutional prerequisites to 
sustain that growth have on the whole been ignored, if not downplayed, 
by the authorities. In the long-term, therefore, the weak foundations on 
which economic growth has been realized can be eventually exhausted. 
In the future, stimulus to growth could turn out to be the factor that 
induces inflationary pressures. In the end, inflation targeting can push 
the economy to a much lower growth path that is incapable of inducing 
sustained economic expansions. 
Proponents of Philippine inflation targeting argue that since its 
implementation, economic performance has been significantly healthier 
because of price stability. While current trends are better compared to 
previous decades in Philippine economic history, it needs to be pointed 
out that too much credit is given to inflation targeting when other factors 
have also played out significantly to stabilize inflation.15 Increasingly, 
actions that lead to an expansion of domestic demand, provision of public 
infrastructure, and bringing in complementary policies that strengthen 
institutions are considered with great caution because they are perceived 
as inflationary actions.16 Perhaps because the Bangko Sentral does not 
15 The net effect of inflation on economic growth is -2 basis points. The details are 
available from the author.
16 Adding the government expenditures and current account balance in the model 
in Footnote 3 improves the regression results. The sum of their coefficients indicates a 
Win or Lose, It’s the Policy We Choose…
259Social Sciences
anymore play an active developmental role, any demand-linked policy is 
considered undesirable, even though such action can lead to a cumulative 
process and expansions in productive capacities that sustain economic 
growth. It needs to be pointed out once again that global economic trends, 
as well as the recent economic performance of the Philippines, have been 
important factors to the success of inflation targeting in the country but 
not the converse. 
Ironically, inflation targeting can take policy away from addressing 
fundamental domestic issues that constrain the economy from realizing 
broad-based economic performance. Persistent unemployment, fiscal 
difficulties because of high public debt, volatile exchange rate and capital 
flows because of relatively open capital accounts and weak financial 
regulation, dismal domestic investments because of lack of investor 
confidence plus continuing political uncertainties, and so on, are issues 
that inflation targeting cannot or does not address. Even conceding the 
empirical results (presented in Table 1) that low rates of inflation can 
bring about stronger economic growth, how much inflation targeting 
contributes to growth is going to be muted in the Philippines since other 
constraints are more decisive in impinging upon economic performance. 
Policy therefore needs to identify and target the most binding constraints 
to economic growth, while realizing that new constraints arise when 
conditions have changed.
If inflation targeting does not address a binding constraint, the Bangko 
Sentral must relax its policy to support other objectives that contribute to 
secure sustained economic growth. It can mean that inflation targeting need 
to take a secondary role with regards to fiscal, income and social policies in 
the country. The responsibility to stabilize prices does not mean focusing 
on too low rates of inflation that compromises economic performance. 
Neither does it mean that inflation is allowed to go uncontrolled because it, 
too, will produce economic problems. If inflation targeting is needed, the 
challenge to the authorities is to identify the greatest constraint to economic 
contribution of 17 basis points to economic growth, while the net effect of inflation to 
growth is 3 basis points. Results are available from the author.
Only fixed capital formation is statistically significant, while both education expenditure 
and labor force growth are not. The results on education, however, can be considered 
weakly significant. In the latter case, the sum of the coefficients indicates a contribution 
of 14 basis points while the net effect of inflation to growth is 13 basis points, implying 
that expansions in aggregate supply-linked factors can induce growth that in turn induce 
expansions in demand-linked factors, thus generating stronger expansions. Results are 
available from the author.
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performance that keeps the economy on a low growth path that is unable 
to accelerate to catch up even with its Southeast Asian tiger neighbors and 
to use targeting to support the overall policy framework for robust and 
sustained economic growth. Pursuing a combination of policies is a better 
strategy for achieving broad-based economic performance and such an 
approach encourages creativity and innovation and institution-building. 
Yet the irony is that because of recent robust growth, inflation targeting 
has been successful and pushed by authorities as a fundamental policy.
CONCLUSION
This paper investigated the relationship between inflation and 
economic growth for the inflation targeters over the period 2001-2006. The 
findings confirmed that inflation is negatively correlated with economic 
growth, but the results also confirmed that economic growth and inflation 
targeting reflect global trends. With already low levels of inflation, it is 
possible to induce economic growth if the inflation targets are relaxed a bit. 
Thus raising growth can be had if aggregate demand- and supply-linked 
indicators are allowed to play bigger roles in the economy. 
 The paper went on to present an analysis of Philippine inflation 
targeting and argued that the good economic performance in recent years 
has been important to the success of inflation targeting, but not the other 
way around. More importantly, the Philippines can engender a robust 
economy through the application of aggregate demand- and supply-
linked factors, thereby raising the economy to a higher growth path. The 
authorities need to be a lot bolder that what they are currently doing to 
explore alternative approaches that can achieve these goals.
Among the inflation targeters, too low inflation can lead to a limited 
amount of economic growth. Allowing for some inflation is therefore 
sensible, as it opens some space for creativity and innovation to achieve 
broad-based economic performance. The findings, however, do not mean 
that inflation is allowed to go wayward because that, too, can mean serious 
economic problems that could erase years of hard work. The results are 
fortunately compelling that a positive combination of policies is a better 
approach than a singular focus on inflation targeting. 
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